Introduction
Professions and their members (or 'professionals') are a conspicuous feature of modern capitalist societies. They operate in many arenas, including the business realm. The starting point for this paper is that the degree to which professions and their members act ethically can have an impact on the ethical quality or behaviour of business in general. In particular, given the focus of this volume, my contention is that 'true' professional behaviour has the potential to impact upon the degree to which large businesses are 'good corporate citizens'. The aim of this chapter is to explore the nature of that potential, and to identify some of the issues involved in determining the degree to which that potential is realized.
The chapter is structured as follows. The section following this brief introduction makes some remarks about the term 'corporate citizenship', outlines the position to be taken for the purposes of the argument being presented, and links corporate citizenship to corporate governance The second section reviews the nature of professions, examines the debate over whether professions can be trusted to serve the public interest, and suggests that professions can vary in the degree to which they fulfil their social potential. The third section outlines the essential features of John Coffee's analysis of professional wish to pursue these questions in any depth here, but I will stake out below an initial position sufficient to motivate the remainder of the chapter.
Of course, much of the power of the term corporate citizen derives from the concept of citizen, but that not only varies from nation to nation, it can also have remarkably little content. For example, the UK Government has been raising the issue of citizenship and, especially, promoting a notion of citizenship in the school curriculum, but for the ordinary Briton -perhaps because we do not have a written constitution -the term seems vague and unimportant, less important than nationality (with which it is often confused) and hence associated with issues of immigration, asylum-seeking etc -often in a negative way. To a British author, therefore, citizenship does not seem an ideal starting point for making real progress in encouraging good behaviour on the part of corporations.
3 Nevertheless, corporate citizenship has entered the vocabulary of business as readily in the UK as anywhere else, and it is accordingly worth taking seriously. And citizenship has been subjected to sustained examination in political theory. Other authors, represented in this volume, have already subjected it to rigorous and useful analysis, and with their help I will clarify my position for the purposes of this chapter. Matten and Crane (2005) note that the usage of the term corporate citizenship has been neither consistent nor clear. In seeking to develop a more robust conceptualization, they identify and set aside two, broad conventional views. The first, which they term the 'limited' view, portrays corporate citizenship as concerned with charitable donations and 3
Of course, the cynic with regards to corporate responsibility and the like might suggest that it is therefore an ideal point of departure, since it has little hope of getting anywhere! other forms of community action, albeit perhaps in a more strategic way than has sometimes been the case in the past. The second, the 'equivalent' view, is so named because it is little more than a re-statement of CSR and thus essentially conflates the two terms. Against this backdrop, Matten and Crane then develop an alternative conceptualization that attempts to use the term corporate citizenship to generate some novel insights. Building upon an understanding of liberal citizenship (the principal template for
Western democracy) they argue that corporations have taken over considerable responsibility from governments -including some responsibilities, in some circumstances, that amount to supporting citizenship. Recognizing the move they have made from the conventional view of the corporation as citizen to a position where the corporation to some extent substitutes for or complements the nation-state with respect to the individual citizen, they acknowledge that their conceptualization might better be termed 'corporate administration of citizenship (as it were, "CAC")' (Matten and Crane 2005, 175, italics in original It seems to me that the second is contentious, to say the least, but that the metaphorical usage is likely to enjoy wider and more easily justifiable support; it will also prove sufficient for this chapter.
Although Matten and Crane (2005) The four models are liberal minimalism, civic republicanism, developmental democracy and deliberative democracy.
are entailed too (see also Moon et al. 2005) . This is where the citizen metaphor might have something novel or powerful to offer to the understanding of the social role of business.
But this tends to beg the question: first, because concepts of citizenship and the obligations associated with them vary (again, see Moon et al. 2005) ; and second, if a corporation is only metaphorically a citizen, the metaphor cannot be used to force some set of obligations upon it, suggestive though such an analysis might be. Nevertheless, at the core of any conception of the citizen in a properly ordered nation-state is the obligation to abide by the rule of law, by which the rights of fellow citizens are in turn protected. Such law may be formalized and written down, or it might be conceptually extended to include unwritten expectations, such as widely accepted customs that have no need of legal underpinning.
However, this is not an issue to be addressed here. The point is that adherence to standards enshrined in law, and perhaps custom, represents the minimum that should be expected of both individual citizens and corporations. This is clearly a somewhat narrow formulation, consistent with the lower levels of Carroll's well-known pyramid (Carroll 1991) This may be amplified with reference to Tricker, who usefully distinguishes governance from the management of a company: 'If management is about running business; governance is about seeing that it is run properly' (Tricker 1984, 6 ).
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For example, creditors -see Cowton (2006) and Davies (2002) .
expected from them, before presenting and discussing Coffee's particular analysis of their gatekeeping role in corporate governance.
Professions
The term 'profession' is generally employed quite loosely in everyday speech, 9 being used to refer to any, or almost any, occupational group. However, it has a narrower, more technical sense when used by sociologists. In distinguishing professions proper from other occupational groups, sociologists highlight some characteristics that professions are expected to possess. Even though the list of features, their relative importance, and hence the related criteria for demarcating between professions and other occupational groups, are subject to considerable debate in the literature, there is enough agreement to provide a basis for taking forward the argument of this chapter.
A good starting for present purposes is the definition provided by Jary and Jary (1991, 501) : 'A profession is any middle class occupational group, characterised by claims to a high level of technical and intellectual expertise, autonomy in recruitment and discipline, and a commitment to public service.' The idea of a commitment to public service represents an opening for relevant professions to play their part in ensuring sound governance of the 'corporate citizen', but it should be noted that the first three elements also have potential implications -positive and negative -for the way in which professions operate and the degree to which they might come to meet the public interest.
9
I am not suggesting that such ordinary language usage is necessarily wrong and in need of correction, but for the purposes of this paper a more restricted sense will be more appropriate.
Jary and Jary's definition captures many of the important features of a profession.
Although it is not easy to be comprehensive in describing either 'a profession' or 'professional work', the literature (e.g. Abbott 1988) tends to agree on the importance of the following characteristics, all or most of which will need to be present for an occupational group to be considered a profession:
10
• there exists a widely agreed and extensive specialist skill and knowledge base, the latter often of a relatively theoretical or abstract/intellectual kind;
• acquisition of the requisite skill and knowledge base involves a long period of training, with formal certification of competence (usually involving written examinations) and, frequently, some form of licence to practise;
• the deployment of the knowledge base involves the use of discretion and (professional) judgment, not just the application of rules to routine circumstances;
• independence and self-regulation are jealously guarded, with control over the requisite knowledge base, setting of entry standards and criteria for membership, and responsibility for the disciplining of members;
• there are ethical codes (often formal, but not exclusively so), independent of contract or state law, and these are self-enforced;
• in many cases, high levels of personal and financial reward.
The classic examples of professions that meet the above criteria are medicine and the law, but the increased complexity and level of development of societies and economies has 10 It might be better to view this list as being indications of family resemblance (see Wittgenstein 1958) rather than providing the basis for an essentialist definition.
thrown up new occupational groups that have aspired to professional status. A good business-related example, of clear pertinence to corporate governance, is accountants.
Although accountancy in some form or other can be considered to be as old as writing itself, and although during the Renaissance in double-entry bookkeeping it reached a level of sophistication that has continued to prove invaluable into the modern era, the 'professional project' of accountants can be seen to have begun with the formation of professional associations in the UK in the nineteenth century. It was with the establishment of such bodies that many of the professional characteristics listed above came to be claimed and enacted by accountants.
Professional bodies also differ in the extent to which they control their domain of activity. In some cases they have de jure control, through legislative or other regulatory backing. In these cases, regulations will state that only members in good standing with a particular professional body (or bodies) will be qualified to undertake a particular task (e.g.
the audit of a particular type of organization). In other cases professional bodies will have As indicated earlier, there is much debate about the definition of a profession, but it can be argued that the interesting question is not whether an occupation is a profession, but why and how an occupational group turns itself into a profession and its members into 'professional people' (Johnson 1972, 31) . According to many commentators, a major part of the professional 'project' is the pursuit of economic advantage. Indeed, as noted earlier, one common feature of professions is the earning power of their members. This may involve an attempt to secure monopoly in the market through the establishment, protection and extension of an effective monopoly jurisdictional claim (Reed 1992) ; or, at least, a profession might seek to secure a privileged position in a market or markets, even if an ICAS Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland exclusive monopolistic position is not attainable. 12 Professions also tend to secure control of entry into the profession itself, thus ensuring not only quality -which might be a reasonable justification -but also restricted supply. Given the demand for its serviceswhich many professions will also seek to stimulate -the restriction of supply of accredited professionals serves, as prices would behave in any market, to push up remuneration.
Thus not all observers are convinced that professions really do serve the public interest; quite the contrary. For example, there have been sustained Marxist and, more recently, consumerist critiques of professions' protection of their privileged position to their own advantage.
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the professional project is pursued not only in the economic order but also in the social order (Macdonald 1995 ; and see the reference to 'class' in Jary and Jary's (1991) definition, quoted earlier). The aim is 'upward social mobility' (Parry and Parry 1976) , with an occupational group seeking to attain collective social status (Larson 1977 ) and respectability. Thus, for example, both expertise and respectability were central to launching the British professional accountancy project in the late nineteenth century (Macdonald 1995 See the earlier reference to de jure and de facto control.
the elevated servants of their fellow-men, an emulation of the 'gentleman of private means', resulting in a gradual claim to that status. Macdonald (1984) argues that the achieved status of the accountancy profession in Scotland was endorsed by the respectability of ascription because its leaders were associated with the gentry, the legal profession and the more respectable (commercial, as opposed to manufacturing) part of the bourgeoisie. That they achieved recognition and 'professional' status earlier than in England can be attributed, in part, to the culture, social structure and stratification system of Scotland in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, the landed gentry and the legal profession were closely related.
Thus the balance of economic and social objectives within 'professional projects', and the manner in which the social objectives are pursued, will vary from one culture to another. Nevertheless, the negative assessment of professions -whatever the particular intellectual form it might take -is that they are fundamentally self-interested endeavours focused upon attaining privilege, and that claims to ethics and serving the public interest are either fallacious or, at best, a misleading 'sideshow'.
Such critical views of professions can be set against not only the claims of professions themselves to serve the public interest, but also earlier sociological analyses of the professions, which seemed content to accept them largely on their own terms and which painted a positive picture of their contribution to society. Indeed, many of the critical analyses were, at least in part, a reaction to the functionalist analysis of professions, which dominated the sociological literature until the early 1970s (Macdonald 1995) . As such, they were probably a useful challenge and corrective, but I think there are reasons why they might be considered to be problematic in some important respects. I wish to make three connected points. The first is that the critical perspectives on professions often carry intellectual baggage, or argue from a general perspective, that might itself be considered to be flawed. However, I do not wish to pursue that issue here, not so much because it is beyond the scope of this paper (though it is), but because some of the problems of professions to which they point are nevertheless plausible risks, even if some of the implications might be less attractive. Second, notwithstanding some fascinating and insightful studies of individual professions, particularly more recently, much of the traditional debate treats professions in a homogeneous manner. Such 'totalizing' discourses leave little or no room for considering whether some professions, in some places or circumstances, at some times, are less prone to abusing their privileged position or, indeed, are even of significant public benefit -albeit that members continue to reap considerable economic and social rewards. My contention is that the actual contribution of a particular profession is a contingent matter, not an inevitability. Third, if there can indeed be variation in the social contribution that professions make, then it is worth considering how that can occur and how it can be encouraged -a strategy that general sceptical arguments about professions will tend to suppress or ignore. Thus it is necessary to overcome the intellectual barrier of seeing professionals themselves gaining, at some level, from the professional project if not from each individual action; it is vital to recognise the importance of positive-sum games in modern economic life, rather than viewing everything in terms of zero-sum games, which might be said to have characterised pre-modern economies (Luetge 2005 
Coffee's gatekeepers
The starting point for Coffee (2006) is that, useful and necessary though previous research by scholars of corporate governance has been, it leaves a blind spot: namely, the professional agents who inform and advise boards of directors. His thesis is that all boards are prisoners of their professional advisers. For this reason, focusing on the board of directors when things go wrong, or calling for higher ethical standards, is almost to miss the point. Boards of directors have been extensively reformed and, in Coffee's opinion, are now more independent and hard-working than ever. While there is room for improvement, they are probably the party 'least responsible' for the corporate scandals that erupted in the early years of this century. A more productive focus is the professional advisers who actor should have acted more effectively -as 'gatekeepers'.
In employing the term 'gatekeeper', Coffee is referring to an independent professional who plays one of two distinct roles: preventing wrongdoing by withholding necessary cooperation or consent; and -a superior conception, according to Coffee -acting as a reputational intermediary to assure investors regarding the quality of the 'signals' sent by the corporation. The intermediary pledges the reputational capital that it is has built up over the years through repeated episodes with different clients.
An auditor expressing a professional opinion on the corporation's annual accounts is an obvious example -indeed, auditors have received much criticism in relation to the recent cases that exercise Coffee's interest -but he also has in mind attorneys, securities analysts, credit-rating agencies and investment bankers. All these parties are in a position to alert investors and others to inadequacies in the governance of a corporation. In observing and commenting on the corporation (e.g. through opinion, rating or even just being willing to work with it), the gatekeeper is lending or pledging its own reputation. Its reputation is, in effect, a hostage. Since reputation is central to the adviser's ability to earn money in relation to a larger set of corporations, its 'comment' on the individual corporation may be taken seriously. Its self-interest in relation to its reputational capital gives a degree of confidence in the quality of the signals it provides about the corporation.
'The gatekeeper is trusted to the extent that it is a repeat player who possesses significant reputational capital that would be lost or depreciated if it were found to have condoned wrongdoing.' (4) This will be expected to happen as long as the reputational loss exceeds the one-off gain from connivance, and this can take place in the absence of legislation. The stronger the reputation, the more highly sought will be the adviser's services as a gatekeeper.
That, at least, is the theory. Of course, Coffee is interested in how this reputational model has come not to work, or to work much less successfully than it once did, and hence has led to, or permitted, the kind of corporate governance crises that we have witnessed in Although they face incentives to do so, gatekeepers will not always seek to protect their reputational capital.
Circumstances can arise in which it is rational to risk that capital. Particularly in concentrated markets, the rational gatekeeper may recognize that it does not need an unblemished record, but only one not significantly worse than its rivals. Indeed, if its rivals have tarnished records, while it instead resembles Snow White, it arguably has made an excessive investment in reputational capital on which it will realize little return. (333) Coffee is pointing out that, since reputation is, competitively speaking, a relative thing, rather than competing to enhance their reputations, gatekeepers might permit their reputations to become noisy and indistinct, as long as entry of new competitors is restricted. This is clearly a problem in terms of credit-rating agencies, which are few in number. It also applies, perhaps more worryingly, to auditors. Reputational self-interest is limited, according to Coffee, especially because the party paying the gatekeeper is typically the party being monitored -not the parties that have most to gain from the gatekeeping function being performed well. This hasn't always been the case, at least not for all gatekeepers. For example, credit rating agencies now receive most of their revenue from the corporation being rated rather than from the user of the information. One of the factors that brings this about is that -through its influence on the corporation's cost of capital -the credit-rating agency creates value for the corporation.
This leads to pressure on the rating agency 'because of the devastating consequences of a rating downgrading' (35). It is thus no surprise that the pattern in ratings downgrades often resembles more 'obituary' than 'prophecy'. Indeed, credit-rating agencies maintained a high rating for Enron until the last days.
In the case of auditors, they are notionally appointed by the shareholders, but in practice it is senior management that is primarily responsible for their engagement. The role and independence of audit committees has been strengthened over the past decade or so (Enron had one that looked good on paper), but against that, the audit has become just one of a package of services provided by the firms. This is Coffee's principal concern about auditors.
Coffee points out that, as early as 1984, consulting revenues were greater than auditing revenues at Arthur Andersen. In other words, non-gatekeeping services were earning more money that auditing, and this helped to replace an older 'professional' culture with a 'business' culture. Audit partners had strict targets for cross-selling non-audit services -making them more salesman than watchdog. The firm's Professional Standards
Group, which provided guidance on whether or not certain accounting treatments were permitted, was downgraded to the extent that local partners could overrule it. Some have used empirical evidence to suggest that non-audit services don't have a negative effect on audit quality, because no statistical relationship has been found linking the two. However, Coffee argues that 'the real conflict lies not in the actual receipt of fees, but in their expected receipt' (66). In other word, a firm hoping to sell non-audit services, not just fearing their loss, might not be as rigorous in its audit as it should be. Thus, accountancy having successfully distinguished itself from the more clerical task of bookkeeping only by stressing its need for independence and its duties to third parties, and thus becoming the 'paradigmatic gatekeeping profession' (103), accounting firms increasingly turned themselves into information consultants, with deleterious implications for their independence.
Coffee naturally asks, 'Why were such obvious conflicts tolerated?' (163) The only answer that he finds plausible is that the major firms feared neither regulatory sanctions nor reputational injury from violation of 'technical' rules.
Reputational injury was less of a consideration because their business strategy was to develop their relations with existing clients, rather than market themselves to new clients based on a reputation for high integrity. In this light, accounting firms had little to fear from the disclosures that they had grown too close to their clients. This would not offend their clients, who by definition already know of these relationships. (163) Such an environment favoured the audit partner skilled at marketing but provided less favourable conditions for the more technically skilled 14 partner. Coffee notes that, in a context where growth was through non-audit revenue, auditors also faced a decline in expected liability costs because of legislative developments and legal decisions, at the same time as they experienced an increase in managerial pressure because of the massive increase in equity-based compensation for executives. Hence the diligence with which they carried out their gatekeeping role was compromised.
Coffee also notes the impact of the stock market bubble, which tends to affect all gatekeepers: they become less relevant and experience a decline in their leverage over clients and the value of their reputational capital. Gatekeepers and their warnings tend to be valued more when investors are more cautious and sceptical. This helps to explain why other gatekeepers, including securities analysts, did not provide an effective substitute for auditors or were not able successfully to call attention to their apparent shortcomings.
Indeed, stock market bubbles pose a special problem for securities analysts, for the cautious ones will be outperformed for as long as the bubble lasts.
Securities analysts also failed to warn investors that auditors were conflicted because they, too, were not in a sufficiently independent position. For example, investment banks earned massive underwriting fees from Enron, which would have been put at risk by adverse comment. But there was more than this going on. For example, a bad opinion from an analyst can prompt a corporation to retaliate by excluding the 'disloyal' analyst from the steady stream of non-public material provided by the corporation, thus putting the analyst at a material disadvantage. Moreover, although securities analysts are critical gatekeepers in capital markets for testing and interpreting corporate disclosures, they are distinctive in several respects, such as having underdeveloped standards and facing limited regulation. On the sell-side, at least, there is a suggestion that they are little more than 'a conspiracy of snake-oil salesmen'.
In these and other ways, the lack of transparency surrounding Enron and other corporations seems attributable less to a single gatekeeper that failed and more to the 'absence of any true gatekeeper in the disclosure process with real responsibility and authority' (34). What was needed -and what was largely absent -was a professional able to express an independent judgment about the appropriateness of the company's financial statements. Coffee's analysis suggests that truly independent opinions on corporations were generally in short supply. His suggestions for dealing with this situation and my comments on his analysis and proposed solutions are the focus of the next section.
Discussion
The previous summary of Coffee's book did not seek to describe every avenue he explores:
for example, it did not examine his comments on attorneys or investment bankers.
14 and independent-minded.
However, it attempted to summarise the principal elements of his analysis, and in this section I wish to highlight briefly what I believe to be his most important contributions before moving on to discuss some respects in which his analysis might warrant further development, particularly bearing in mind the earlier section of this chapter dealing with professions.
Coffee's is a very persuasive analysis, displaying a keen awareness of legal, economic and historical factors. He recognises the difference that the structure of share ownership can make, focusing his attention on the dispersed ownership pattern characteristic of many large US corporations and acknowledging the different governance risks that the concentrated ownership traditionally associated with continental Europe tends to bring about. Of course, since he is working from a particular set of events, he is always likely to come up with an explanation that 'fits' his description of them. Nevertheless, there are real and useful insights. Undoubtedly, one of the key points that Coffee's analysis demonstrates is that more attention needs to be paid in both academic and policy discussions of corporate governance to the professionals who surround the parties normally focused upon -the shareholders, the board of directors, and management. Even if rhetorical flourishes such as describing boards as the 'least responsible' for governance failures and as 'prisoners' of gatekeepers might seem too strong, it is nevertheless the case that broadening the field of analysis in this way is a valuable step. Of course, auditors have -recently, and in the past -been much discussed in relation to corporate governance failures, but Coffee's analysis adds something in identifying them as just one gatekeeper among many. He performs a valuable service in pointing out that there is a whole set of highly expert occupational groups surrounding the corporation. Where one gatekeeper does not do its job properly, it might be hoped that another might make up for its inadequacies.
Coffee, by taking a broader view of gatekeepers, both points to their importance for sound corporate governance and alerts us to the position that they have come to find themselves in.
Furthermore, while previous historical and economic work has demonstrated that legislation is not necessary to generate a demand for audit, Coffee succeeds in showing the importance of reputational capital, 15 which -in his hands -not only explains how audit quality can vary from firm to firm and over time, but also is something of relevance to other gatekeepers. Most important, he explains how gatekeepers can collectively come to fail.
Coffee's focus on gatekeeper failure might seem to bring him into line with the critical perspectives on professions, discussed earlier. In effect, he sees the professions' behaviour as being driven by private gain which leads, in due course, to damage to the public interest. He does not seem to doubt the expertise of the groups he examines so much as the manner in which that expertise is deployed. Yet in highlighting the particular problems of the recent past, he implicitly points to better times in the more distant past. Given the detail and confidence of his earlier analysis, Coffee's proposals are surprisingly general and tentative -though perhaps that is a general feature of academic writing. For example, in the case of securities analysts he states:
The bottom line then is that for the securities analyst to perform as an honest gatekeeper, two linked problems must be solved that have persisted …: (1) analysts must be protected from retaliation, including pressures from the buy-side and issuers, and not just from pressures within the investment banking firm (which is the only context that Sarbanes-Oxley addresses); and (2) a means must be found by which to subsidize research in the case of the smaller cap market without that subsidy distorting the research. (273) At which point the chapter ends! Coffee's general belief, though, is that 'gatekeepers work well only when their performance is subject to effective monitoring ' (354) . Given that much of his analysis, like most corporate governance work, draws on agency theory, even if only informally, it is perhaps not surprising that his main proposal is that the gatekeepers, as agents, should be brought under the control of stronger, more effective principals. Thus the most promising reform would be to re-establish a direct principal-agent relationship between investors and their gatekeepers, but where shareholdings are widely dispersed, he acknowledges that this is easier said than done. Since 'true' principals for the gatekeepers are hard to find, he suggests that the audit committee may be 'the strongest monitor one can find for the auditor, attorney, or investment banker.' This seems a somewhat half-hearted proposal, but this is understandable when it is remembered, first, that he earlier said that the board -of which the audit committee is a sub-committee -was probably the 'least responsible' for recent governance problems; and second, that he also pointed out that Enron possessed what appeared to be a good audit committee. It has to be admitted that he did criticise the operation of Enron's audit committee, but his criticism -based on time spent in meetingsis not entirely convincing (members might have done a great deal of preparatory work outside formal meetings) and, more significantly, if Enron's potentially strong audit committee was not effective, what is to give us any confidence that others will be? This is not to suggest that audit committees, and further development of their role, would not be worthwhile, but it seems more is needed from Coffee, particularly given his apparent lack of enthusiasm for his proposal -which he does not develop at any great length.
One avenue that Coffee does not explore is dealing with the gatekeepers as professions. Although the title of his book refers to 'the professions', it will be apparent from the earlier discussion of this chapter that some of the parties that he analyses would However, Coffee fails to take advantage of the possibility of paying some attention to proper professional bodies, which are associated with some of the parties he examines, as a possible lever for influencing behaviour. Instead, he focuses all his attention at the level of the firm. Given the lack of both specificity and confidence of his proposals, it seems worth exploring professional bodies, where they do exist, a little further.
This is not to imply that Coffee is unaware of professional bodies. He has a very interesting chapter on the history of the accountancy profession, for example. Indeed, it may be the case that his assessment of the behaviour of professional bodies leads him to conclude that there is no point looking in their direction for any help in improving the behaviours of the gatekeepers within their jurisdiction. 'In principle, professional discipline could substitute for private or public enforcement in order to maintain professional standards.' (156) However, in the case of accountancy -which is one of the more developed 'professional' groups he considers -he notes that it was always characterised by weaker professional control from the outset in the United States than in Great Britain, because it lacked control over both entry and exit. 16 This meant that 'from its earliest days, the profession undertook only a relatively toothless form of self-policing' (116).
Nevertheless, while he believes that the accountancy professional bodies have been weak watchdogs, he describes them as an effective guild. For example, he describes how the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) and the American Society of Certified Public Accountants (ASCPA), long fierce rivals, merged in 1937 in order to better resist the dangers of a federal takeover by the SEC. This helped the accountancy profession to achieve the two goals that it has consistently pursued over its century-long evolution. First, it has sought to acquire and preserve professional autonomy (though how many professions would not seek to do this? As explained earlier, it is one of the characteristics that serves to mark out an occupational group as professional.) Second, it has sought to limit its gatekeeping responsibilities.
Given this overall characterisation of the accountancy profession -that it resists demands from the state and yet poorly disciplines its own members to meet those restricted 16 He also views peer review as ineffective, 'producing just review and more review, with no meaningful sanctions being imposed' (p.157).
demands -it seems surprising that the accountancy profession enjoys any status at all. This empirical observation must stand as a challenge to the completeness and fairness of Coffee's analysis. Another important point to note, particularly given the interest of this section in Coffee's proposals for improvement, is that his contrasting of the US and British accountancy professions reinforces the earlier insight that the contribution of professional bodies is a variable; and being variable, it is subject to influence. Moreover, although he does not describe it in such terms, it is clear that where true professional bodies exist that relate to his gatekeepers, he sees strategies and strategic choice at work. The outcomes are not determined wholly by the structural features of the context. Again, this points to the possibility of influence, presumably by the state or its representative.
Perhaps, though, Coffee would see little potential here. Although he does not examine this avenue in any depth, he does conclude from his analysis of the accountancy profession that professions are difficult to regulate, even when the political will to do so exists. His reasoning is that few agencies 'can claim to possess the broad expertise necessary to adopt comprehensive rules governing a profession, and thus regulators are predictably forced to defer to the profession on most technical questions' (130). This seems unconvincing. First, regulators can acquire expertise but, more important, they can and should work at a more general level, setting the agenda and monitoring outcomes; they don't need to get into the most abstruse technical detail. If 'out-sourcing' to professional bodies -for so it can be seen -is going to be worthwhile, regulators should not become involved in technical detail. Second, just because it is difficult to control professional bodies does not mean it is impossible to influence them. And since Coffee hasn't come up with a convincing solution to the challenges of corporate governance that he has delineated, it is worth thinking further about how this might take place.
In order to pursue the possibility of influencing gatekeepers through professional bodies, I suggest that a more sophisticated understanding of professions is needed than that offered by Coffee. Just as Coffee redrew the map of corporate governance to include gatekeeping professionals, so too, the complexity of the professional terrain needs to be appreciated. This should include insights from the sociology of professions, which was briefly reviewed earlier, and a more sophisticated appreciation of the way in which professional bodies operate. This should include a recognition of factors such as:
• the tensions that can develop between professional firms and professional bodies, which themselves suggest that professional bodies do put firms under pressure;
• the ways in which professional bodies' and professional firms' respective reputational capitals are mutually dependent; and
• the possibility that professions can, to some degree and in their own particular ways, act as substitutes for one another -which in turn opens up for regulators the option of playing one off against the other.
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Such an expanded understanding of professions should also recognise social as well as economic rewards. Coffee focuses on the economic, perhaps because of his US perspective or his dominant intellectual perspective, or both. 18 Yet, as explained earlier,
There is much historical evidence of how professions have competed with each other as they have sought to redefine their domains of expertise and activity. Note, too, the overlapping -and hence, to some extent, competing -UK professional accountancy bodies referred to in an earlier footnote.
18
One of the few purely social points that Coffee makes is that accountancy's middle-class, 'democratic' status means that it has 'little of the sense of noblesse oblige that characterizes a profession with more aristocratic aspirations ' (p.146). professional strategies take place in the social as well as the economic realm, which expands the range of levers that regulators are able to pull, though these are likely to be more culture-specific in their range and effects than economic levers.
One way of characterising what I am suggesting is that we ought to consider professional bodies as the gatekeepers' gatekeepers, thus responding to the ancient question "Qui custodiet custodiens?"
19 Or, to put it in other, Coffee-esque terms, I am suggesting that the state and its regulators should, if necessary, seek to be a stronger 'principal' to the professional body 'agents'. In doing so, rather than simply calling for professions to be more ethical, the most productive way will be to so structure conditions that they encourage behaviour which is in both the professions' own interest and the public interest (see Luetge 2005) . No single measure, or even source of measures, will ever be sufficient. A perfect and permanent equilibrium is not achievable. But given the paucity of Coffee's own proposals, to ignore professional bodies as amenable to influence by the regulators seems a missed opportunity. Of course, some of Coffee's gatekeepers do not have associated professional bodies, but that just serves to emphasise one of the limitations of his analysis and the benefits of a fuller appreciation of the term 'professional'. Furthermore, it suggests the option for regulators not just to seek to influence existing professional bodies but perhaps also to encourage the establishment of professional standards and associations in those areas of gatekeeping not currently professionalised.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that, whatever corporate citizenship is normatively held to entail, sound governance is necessary. A good corporate citizen is a well governed corporation.
Experience suggests that, even within the conventional system -focused on shareholders, boards of directors and management -good governance is far from guaranteed. John
Coffee's work demonstrates the importance of 'gatekeepers' and reputational capital to the corporate governance process, and his analysis provides useful insights into how professionals have come to be less effective in their gatekeeping role than they once were.
His suggestions for making those gatekeepers more effective in the future, though, are surprisingly vague and tentative. 20 It is argued here that a fuller appreciation of the nature of professions and their strategies offers the prospect of a complementary way forward, providing other options and hence more chance of success. Such an approach would take seriously both the rhetoric of professions and the risk that they don't live up to it. Perhaps, with the encouragement of professional citizenship, corporate citizenship will find itself on a firmer footing.
20
A similar criticism might be made, I suppose, of my own suggestions, though in defence I would point out that they were simply the final part of a chapter-length argument, not the conclusion of a booklength analysis.
